

TOWARD A FEMINIST HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WOMAN SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY EXPLORATION OF SUFFRAGE ARGUMENTS, CITIZENSHIP, AND GENDER AS AN ANALYTIC CATEGORY

Molly Daichendt
Grand Canyon University

*This essay discusses the two types of suffrage arguments, as detailed by Aliene S. Kraditor's 1965 *The Ideas of the Woman Suffrage Movement: 1890-1920*, through the lens of gender as an analytic category and an exploration on the nature of citizenship. The American Woman Suffrage movement is examined as a multidimensional living, breathing movement whose sharp differences among women helped and hindered the fight for suffrage.*

INTRODUCTION

This article explores, through interdisciplinarity, how American suffragists perceived the nature of citizenship by analyzing two categories of suffrage argumentation. This is a timely research topic in American Women's history for two reasons. First, current political engagement in American politics is still rife with positive and negative essentialism. Often women feel required to participate in the two-party system, and women are treated as a voting bloc and not as individuals. Second, women continue to be underrepresented in the study of American history. An undergraduate history student will often reach upper-division classes before being introduced to suffragists beyond Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony, and rarely within an undergraduate history program will students be introduced to the differences within the American Woman Suffrage movement. As is often the case with "outside" political movements, the movement is portrayed as monolithic. The aim of this article is to show a multidimensional living, breathing movement whose sharp differences among women helped and hindered the fight for suffrage.

While this research question is worth exploring, because women in general have been written out of history, it does focus mainly on White women. This article is an effort to bring not only American

women's history but feminist American women's history to the front. The suffrage arguments in the chosen primary source documents are analyzed using Kraditor's categories of suffrage arguments: justice and expediency. Many arguments will fall into either category, while others are harder to fit into Kraditor's framework. By analyzing the suffrage arguments in this way, the question can then be asked, what did these suffragists think about the nature of citizenship as explained by Shklar? The answer depends upon the argument used by each suffragist. The primary source documents are also analyzed using Hawkesworth's theory of gender as an analytical category.

These same questions are asked of the selected historiography. Analyzing the primary source documents lays the foundation for the claim that suffrage arguments from justice were the stronger, more stable argument and also demonstrates how to effectively use the lenses of Kraditor, Shklar, and Hawkesworth. Then the lenses are used in the selected historiography to emphasize a feminist perspective.

Suffrage argumentation allows for analysis of citizenship, how gender functioned for elite White women within the American Woman Suffrage movement, and how conceptions of gender changed and influenced suffrage arguments. This research

question is distinctly separate from most of the recent scholarship on the American Woman Suffrage movement, because this topic focuses on specific argumentation rather than focusing on a region, a person, sexuality, race/ethnicity, or class. This article attempts to make a broader claim pertaining to suffrage argumentation instead of a narrowly focused microhistory.

This exploration relies on the work of an American Women's historian and two feminist theorists: Aileen Kraditor's *Ideas of the Woman Suffrage Movement: 1890–1920*, emphasizing her two categories of suffrage arguments of justice and expediency; Judith Shklar's *American Citizenship: The Quest for Inclusion*, with a focus on her first criteria of citizenship; and Mary Hawkesworth's *Feminist Inquiry: From Political Conviction to Methodological Innovation*, focusing on the idea of gender as an analytic category. Utilizing Hawkesworth's theory of gender as an analytic category along with Shklar's notions of citizenship, the historiography and primary source documents of the American Woman Suffrage movement can be analyzed as a feminist history. Viewing the American Woman Suffrage movement without acknowledging gender as an analytic category or exploring beliefs about citizenship creates a monolithic historiography with an emphasis on universal sisterhood.

Using Kraditor's categories of justice and expediency permits the overlaying of Shklar's theory of citizenship onto suffrage arguments. Combining Kraditor and Shklar's heuristics allows for an in-depth study on how these arguments influenced suffragists and their conceptions of the nature of citizenship. Also, utilizing Hawkesworth's theory of gender as an analytic category allows scholars to produce a historiography about the Woman Suffrage movement that explains how gender controlled women's actions within the movement.

In a detailed analysis of primary source documents from two archives, *The Woman's Journal* retrieved from Nineteenth Century Collections Online Women Transnational Network, and the six volumes of the *History of Woman Suffrage* (HWS), this article examines the differences in suffrage argumentation through Kraditor's lens of justice and expediency and demonstrates how

these arguments grant insight into what different suffragists believed about the nature of citizenship.

The two archives reflect the chasm in the American Woman Suffrage movement created by the split over supporting the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution. This rift, which will be discussed in depth later on, led to the creation of competing Woman Suffrage organizations and publications with Stone and Blackwell creating the *Woman's Journal*. When suffragists lead by Anthony began to compile documents for the HWS, Lucy Stone would not participate, which caused the collection to be woefully incomplete. The *Woman's Journal* fills in gaps left by HWS.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

A tension exists between the discipline of history and Women's Studies. As a discipline, history places rules on whom and what is deemed worthy of study while Women's Studies seek to “make power dynamics visible—probing silences, absences, and distortions in dominant paradigms” (Hawkesworth, 2006, p.6). History by its nature is a bridge discipline and Women Studies is an interdiscipline. Examining Kraditor's heuristic while utilizing the frameworks of Shklar and Hawkesworth allows for an interdisciplinary approach to the American Woman Suffrage movement as a key element in women's history.

Aileen Kraditor's 1965 *The Ideas of the Woman Suffrage Movement, 1890–1902*, details the two main political arguments popular among suffragists, the natural law argument and the argument of benevolence, or as Kraditor (1965) details, the arguments of “justice and expediency” (p. 71). The justice argument for Woman Suffrage grew from the ideas built into the Declaration of Independence: “If all men were created equal and had inalienable right to consent to the laws by which they were governed, women were created equal to men and had the same inalienable right to political liberty” (Kraditor 1965, p. 44). Women who argued from justice/natural law, such as Stanton and Anna Howard Shaw, believed that women, because of their humanity, inherently deserved the right to vote. Since the ballot determined full citizenship, proponents of Woman Suffrage who argued from the natural rights/justice perspective had an inherently stronger and more stable argument,

because the only condition required for the vote was citizenship as defined by the government. Kraditor marks the years of 1848–1900 as the most popular time for justice arguments.

Often suffragists arguing from expediency wanted the ballot as a means to protect themselves from the “harmful” elements recently introduced by the expansion of suffrage to black men. Many White Southern suffragists argued that women ought to vote due to their education levels and ownership of property, and a majority of these same women wanted the ballot to secure White supremacy. Kraditor (1965) points to Southern suffragists, Belle Kearney and Kate Gordon, who advocated for “educational and property qualifications to apply to men and women . . . of both races,” (p. 201) in order to vote. These roadblocks included literacy tests, the requirement of property ownership, and poll taxes could thwart the ability of many men and women of color to vote. The expediency argument carried an underlying message of instability. If women should be enfranchised because they meet certain qualifications, then those qualifications could change as conditions change.

However, Kraditor did recognize the differences within suffragists who argued from expediency. While many Southern suffragists argued for expediency based on racist assumptions, the expediency argument, which had roots in the Temperance movement, later found allies in the Progressivism, Populist, and Labor movements. Progressive activists sought the franchise to aid their communities and families. The Progressive argument for expediency grew out of the idea that woman’s nature was softer than man’s, and that a woman’s roles of wife and mother made her especially suited to vote, because their vote would be a force for good. Expediency “stress[ed] what enfranchised women could do for the government and their communities” (Kraditor 1965, p. 66). Women would clean up the dirty business of politics, work to enact protective legislation for women and children, and support government regulation of food and water.

Before the 19th century, women privately did things like primary food preparation and sewing clothing. Kraditor (1965) noted that as these processes moved into an industrialized public arena, women “ . . . assumed that their training as

cooks, seamstresses, house cleaners, and mothers qualified them to help in legislation concerned with food inspection, sweatshop sanitation, and public schools” (p. 68). Since issues of the home traditionally fell under the category of women’s work, many Progressive women demanded the ability to affect policy in that arena. Kraditor argues that with the advent of Progressivism, suffragists shifted their argument from justice to an argument of benevolence/expediency. She marked the prime years for the expediency argument as 1900–1920.

Jane Addams, the mother of modern American social work, supported the expediency argument for suffrage as did Francis Willard, the Temperance heroine who argued that enfranchising women would lead to an extension of woman’s traditional domestic sphere as “enlarged housekeeping” (Addams 1912, p. 67). While Addams argued for suffrage based on expediency, Kraditor believes that Addams embraced immigrant women and sought to enfranchise them, not to gain the vote but to keep out the “negative influences” of people of color. Kraditor (1965) points out that the “egalitarianism that in early suffragist philosophy had grown out of the abolitionists’ defense of the Negro now returned to the late suffragist philosophy via a Chicago social worker’s defense of the immigrant” (p. 143). Addams is one foil to Kraditor’s argument, which serves to show the line between justice and expediency was not as sharp or impenetrable as she wrote in 1965.

In 2015, Louise M. Newman published an article exploring the impact of Kraditor’s monograph on the study of American women’s suffrage and detailing some criticism of her work. Newman credits Kraditor for opening this particular field of women’s history, and she believes Kraditor’s original categories of arguments of justice and expediency hold true almost fifty years later; however, Newman critiques Kraditor’s sharp timeline between the two arguments. According to Kraditor, justice was the main suffrage argument and was utilized most frequently from 1848 to 1900. Kraditor argues that from 1900 until the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment, the nature of the argument shifted to one of expediency. Kraditor credits the shift in arguments to the Progressive movement. Newman (2015), however, notes that the majority of suffrage historians “reject Kraditor’s conceptualization of a divide between the supposed

greater prevalence of egalitarian arguments during the nineteenth century and the greater prevalence of expediency arguments in the Progressive Era” (p. 294). Regardless, Kraditor’s initial categories of justice and expediency are supremely important.

Shklar’s seminal work, *American Citizenship*, offers scholars investigating the history of the Woman Suffrage movement a way to analyze the differing arguments used by suffragists. Shklar (1991) asks scholars to view citizenship through the eyes of those “who have been [historically] denied all or some of its attributes, and who ardently wanted to become full citizens” (p. 15). Shklar also notes that the first essential mark of citizenship was the vote, and that examining the basis of both suffrage arguments allows the clarification of beliefs concerning citizenship.

Shklar (1991) explains that suffragists understood that the franchise was the key to becoming full participatory citizens: “Not to be heard is not to exist, to have no visibility and no place politically” (p. 59). As long as women could not vote, women could be controlled and relegated to the domestic sphere. Utilizing Shklar’s theory of defining citizenship by those who have historically been denied it allows for the analysis of different argumentations for Woman Suffrage. In *American Citizenship*, Shklar argued that a second qualifier of citizenship is the ability of the individual to produce economically; however, this article will only focus on her first essential mark of citizenship—the ability to vote for the government and laws under which citizens lived.

Hawkesworth’s *Feminist Inquiry* explores the nature of gender as an analytic category. Feminist scholars are careful not to use gender as an analytic category in any way that erases or glosses over all other forms of oppression many women experienced. If used incorrectly, gender as an analytic category can cause women’s historical experiences to be homogenized, and women are seen as functioning equally within a system of oppression. Also, gender as an analytic category can be used incorrectly by offering gender as a means to explain “why gender performs a particular social function” instead of “how gender operates under specific historical conditions” (Hawkesworth, 2006, p. 174). Yet, Hawkesworth argues that “the very pervasiveness of gender requires systematic feminist analysis”

(p. 148). Hawkesworth notes that if the scholar views gender as a fluid concept that shifts between historical and cultural context, then gender as an analytic category can provide “the analytic tools to loosen the strictures of the natural attitude and the oppressive social relations that the natural attitude legitimates” (p. 149). Instead, it is important to use gender as an analytic category to tease out the differences of how women’s experiences of gender differed along lines of class, race, and region.

Examining the Woman Suffrage movement with the use of gender as an analytic category allows for a more dynamic study. Without the use of gender as an analytic category the history of the Woman Suffrage movement would be flat and static, and historians would make universal statements about “sisterhood” and what it means to be a woman. “Recognizing that gender appears only in culturally specific forms in no way mitigates the force of gender analysis . . . gender as an analytic category illuminates crucial cultural processes” (Hawkesworth, 2006, p. 148).

These key concepts of gender as an analytic category are used in this article to critically examine the historiography of Woman Suffrage and the primary source documents. The vocabulary of Women’s Studies will also be helpful; for example, knowing that gender speaks to gendered actions, while gender roles explain what is expected of people based on their gender from a specific time, place, and cultural understanding of the concepts of what is acceptable behavior, is important.

In using gender as an analytical category of analysis, we can see the truly radical nature of these arguments. The natural rights/justice argument did not require women to speak of themselves in gendered terms. Instead of arguing for the vote because women were more moral, filled with benevolence, and better educated than men of color, these suffragists argued that in the eyes of the law, women should be seen as no different from men. Suffragists using the justice argument adopted the masculine language of the Founding Fathers. These women, using that same argument and language, displaced the political ideas of the time surrounding femininity and womanliness, and instead they argued that they shared an inherent sameness with White American men.

The goal of the natural rights/justice argument

was to prove that these founding principles should extend to women. Yet, while this rhetoric offered an inherently stable foundation for suffragists, it was more radical than the benevolence/expediency argument. The benevolence/expediency argument utilized traditional notions of gender, and its foundation was that women's nature was different from men's. Women's softer nature would extend household duties and family values into politics, making women's "nature" the primary qualification for voting rather than a common humanity.

Expediency argued women would vote primarily as traditionally gendered women, with a focus on child welfare in the home, at school, and in their places of work. In the South, White women voters would extend noblesse oblige while strengthening the White supremacist apparatus in government. In the North, Midwest, and West, women would focus their vote on protections for women in the form of Temperance legislation. The Temperance wing of the Woman Suffrage movement focused on controlling the liquor traffic. Since alcohol was tied to abuses in the family, women voters would vote as a bloc to end the suffering produced by the consumption of alcohol. This assumed that women's primary concern would be the protection of the family rather than the protection of individual rights. The foundation of the benevolence/expediency argument rested on women's behavior and "nature."

ANALYZING SUFFRAGE ARGUMENTS IN PRIMARY SOURCE DOCUMENTS

At the 1852 Syracuse National Convention, Rev. Antoinette L. Brown delivered an address regarding women and the law. She drew attention to the claim of the distinct separations and differences between the sexes. Her argument called for political equality between men and women because "man cannot represent woman" (Brown, 1852, p. 524). Brown did not call upon the inherent natural rights of citizens of America; instead, she argued that women's place in the American justice system was wholly unjust, and that women lived under a system of laws created and enforced by men. As a result, women did not have an equal share in work, marriage, or childrearing. This inequality also produced a justice system inherently biased against women. Brown (1852) appealed to "[c]ommon justice [that] demands that a part of the law-makers

and law executors should be of her own sex" (p. 524). Since this argument is difficult to label as either an argument from justice or expediency, the discussions of the nature of citizenship must also become more nuanced.

Brown demanded that women have equal participation in government as a means to achieve equal justice. Yet, she argued, there is a fundamental and foundational difference between men and women. This sentiment was most clearly expressed when she discussed a woman on trial in front of an all-male jury. Brown (1852) contests "there may have been temptations and various palliating circumstances connected with her peculiar nature as a woman such as a man cannot appreciate" (p. 524). Since men may not judge a female criminal justly, the solution must be to include women as jurists. However, Brown did not base her address on the natural rights/justice argument of common humanity; instead, she argued for expedience to produce "common justice" (p. 525). Kradt charts the sharp change in suffrage arguments beginning in 1900 from justice to expediency. Yet, Brown's 1852 address again demonstrates that the time frame and lines between the use of justice and expediency arguments prove to be much more porous and fluid.

In September 1853, the New York Times published reviews of suffrage speeches given at the recent New York Woman's Convention. Caroline Severance's address embraced the natural rights/justice argument. She clearly called upon the "equal humanity" (Severance, 1853, p. 569) that lived in men and women. She broadened her argument, stating that there are differences in men the world over, but differences in country and race did not disqualify each from "the vast brotherhood of man" (Severance, p. 569). Severance argued that though there might be differences between men and women, that to disqualify women from equal citizenship was "fraught with evil, as subversive of the Creator's economy and design" (Severance, p. 569). Severance addressed a group of men and women who valued the life and dignity of people of color. A broader, perhaps Southern audience, would not appreciate her argument. However, her use of a justice argument gave her address a stable foundation, which suggests Severance's view of citizenship did not depend upon a person's actions or qualifications.

In 1859 a petition entitled: Memorial. To the Honorable Legislature of the State of ____ signed by Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Susan B. Anthony, Antoinette Brown, and others, reached congressional representatives of each state. The petitioners called on individual states to enfranchise all women in order to fully accept the promises of the Republican form of government, and chief among the promises, the “inalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” (Stanton et al., 1859, p. 675) to all citizens. The authors asked how men could claim women as members of a republic when a woman’s life was not her own by the nature of being governed by “laws to which she has never consented” (Stanton et al., 1859, p. 675). Any citizen woman who faced a trial would do so with the exclusion of half of her peers—her life and liberty resting solely in the hands of men who had decided for her that she warranted no voice in making or executing the laws of her country. The suffragists argued that any woman denied the franchise was denied the pursuit of happiness because her life and liberty were essential to the pursuit of happiness. These political infringements on her person negated the claim of America being a Republic, because “what principle of republicanism, justice or common humanity” (Stanton et al., 1859, p. 675) denies half of the citizen population equal participation that republic? The authors did not ask for a federal amendment enfranchising women. After the crushing defeat of being left out of the 14th Amendment, suffragists focused on state-by-state campaigns as the best way of achieving the vote.

This courageous petition, steeped in the language of justice and natural rights, strengthened their argument for suffrage; however, their language focused on women’s common humanity and not on their feminine virtues. The language of justice disregarded gender language. Demanding enfranchisement as the means to achieve full citizenship, as had the men of the American Revolution, was risky. Congress did not react kindly to women demanding equal participation through the language and concepts that traditionally applied only to men. Perhaps most outrageous, in the eyes of the legislative recipients, was the claim that women living in 1859 lived under laws that are “far more unjust and tyrannical than that which our [founding] fathers repudiated at the mouth of the cannon . . .” (Stanton et al., 1859, p. 675).

The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments caused the dissolution of the American Equal Right’s Association. Stanton and Anthony went on to found the National Woman Suffrage Association. Lucy Stone and her husband Henry Blackwell set off to blend female suffrage with Black suffrage and created the American Woman Suffrage Association. In 1867 Blackwell penned a pamphlet that was circulated in the South called “What the South Can Do.” In this pamphlet Blackwell blended the justice and expediency arguments to call on Southern legislators to enfranchise women along with Black men. He charged that if the North and South could not come together on the issue of Black male suffrage, the country would be at risk of another civil war. Blackwell proffered the best and most generous way for the South to accept Negro suffrage would be to also extend voting rights to Southern women.

By enfranchising women, the South would expand their voter base. Blackwell used demographic data to show that of the 12,000,000 Southern citizens only 4,000,000 were Black men and women. The newly enfranchised White women would be able to offset any “negative consequences” of Black enfranchisement. Blackwell (1867) asked, “Can any Southerner fear to trust the women of the South with the ballot?” (p. 712). Blackwell pointed out now that if Black citizens counted as whole persons the South’s Electoral College power would increase. Southern Whites would be in control of state legislature, and they would have extended power in the federal government. Blackwell argued that this new political power would allow the South to stave off any “future inroads to fanaticism” (p. 712) from the North.

Here, Blackwell utilized an expediency argument. He encouraged Southern legislators to grant women the vote as a means to control newly freed Black men and women. Yet, Blackwell (1867) does engage an overarching justice argument, stating “[b]ut the propriety of your making the proposal lies deeper than any consideration of sectional expediency. If you must try the Republican experiment, try it fully and fairly” (p. 712). Blackwell presented the South with a precedent. The State of New Jersey from 1776 until 1807 allowed both Black Americans and women to vote. “. . . women and [N]egros voted on precisely the same footing as White men. No catastrophe, social or political, ensued” (Blackwell

1867, p. 173). Blackwell closed by adding that if the Democratic South enfranchised women and Black men, the party would expand into the North, “The men of positive convictions would rally round the new and consistent Democratic party” (p. 713).

Blackwell firmly believed in the natural rights/justice argument, and he wished to see both women and Black men attain suffrage. He showed political savvy by crafting a specific expediency argument for the South, knowing that many Southern state legislators did not embrace the justice argument as a means to push for women’s enfranchisement. He hoped this expediency argument would further the goals of his belief system. Therefore, Blackwell’s wielding of an expediency argument does not mean he believed in conditional citizenship. Here scholars can note that Kraditor’s sharp and firm dichotomy between the arguments of justice and expediency proved to be much more malleable.

Gender played a large part in Blackwell’s argument. He called on Southern legislators to enfranchise both Black men and women in general out of protective instinct. When Blackwell claimed that extending suffrage would prevent any ill effects of “Negro” voting, he is making a direct call to Southern men to protect not only the “Southern way” but to also protect Southern women from any perceived negative consequences of the Black vote.

Along with abolition, the Temperance movement brought women into public political activism. For Susan B. Anthony, Temperance and suffrage shared similar goals, the protection and political participation of women. Temperance activists often embraced Woman Suffrage as a way to strengthen the political base of their cause. Yet making Temperance the sole reason to extend the franchise to women inherently limited the political beliefs and behaviors of the women. In 1874 W. F. Crispin advocated, in an editorial for the *Woman’s Journal*, Woman Suffrage as a means to enact Temperance legislation. “How shall we best secure good laws and their enforcement? . . . Woman Suffrage is just what is needed to carry on this work to competition” (Crispin 1874, p. 66). Crispin argued that since women made up the largest portion of the Temperance movement, the enfranchisement of women was an expeditious way to increase the Temperance lobby. He noted that women suffered greatly as a result of “the evils of intemperance

more than any other class” (Crispin 1874, p. 66), yet women were denied any political power that could ease their suffering. He also pointed to women’s public participation in Temperance efforts, by going in groups and armed with Bibles to plead in bars and saloons, as helping pave the way for voting, the most public of political participation. Crispin urged the Ohio Constitutional Convention to submit a state Woman Suffrage amendment. He was sure the political infrastructure of Temperance activism would lend itself to the cause of Woman Suffrage. Crispin (1874) powerfully rounded out his editorial:

[D]eal out sledge-hammer blows against the libel of calling this a “government by the people and for the people,” while one-half of the people have no voice either in making or administering the laws, and are governed and taxed without their consent (p. 66).

Crispin mounts yet another argument that made use of both expedience and justice rhetoric. The foundation of women’s involvement in Temperance activism rested on seeking protections for women and their families from the negative effects of alcohol. Yet, without the vote, women could not enact Temperance legislation. Women should vote not on the basis of justice or natural rights, but because they deserve legal recourse in the fight against alcohol. However, Crispin did include an appeal to justice to punctuate his argument. The women of Ohio would not achieve the prohibition of alcohol as long as the government regarded them as subcitizens.

Crispin’s argument assumed a majority of women supported Temperance and that women would be a monolithic voting bloc. Since that was his desired outcome, his argument can be seen as Woman Suffrage hinging on women’s ability to vote the “correct way.” The right of women to achieve full participatory citizenship centered on what Crispin deemed as appropriate behavior. The linchpin of his argument, that women would vote en masse Temperance, was insupportable. The scholar must wonder if Crispin would have supported Woman Suffrage in Ohio if he believed the majority of women did not support Temperance. Since women had only a modicum of political protection against husbands who abused alcohol and in turn abused their families, Temperance activism

was a legitimate (and potentially dangerous) way to try and limit abuses. Male Temperance support for Woman Suffrage also had a highly gendered component. Suffrage wrought through or because of Temperance focused on women in the private sphere as homemakers and defenders of their families. This was a far less radical than arguing for Woman Suffrage because men and women share the same natural rights to equal justice under the law.

In the North, too, suffragists used the rhetoric of White supremacy. Addressing Congress in March of 1844, suffragists Mary Seymour Howell and Lillie Deverux Blake argued expeditiously that Woman Suffrage would protect the United States from immigrants. Howell (1884) reasoned the legislative branch would benefit from women's participation: "God gave us to you to help you in this . . . journey . . . by our love and our intellect to help make our country pure and noble" (p. 39). She implicitly argued Woman Suffrage would allow America to retain its White identity against an influx of immigrants. Howell (1884) implored, "We ask for the ballot for the good of the race" (p. 39). This is the same expediency argument made by Southern suffragist looking to maintain White supremacy.

Blake's (1884) argument was far more explicit: "To those who fear that our American institutions are threatened by this gigantic inroad of foreigners . . . the best safeguard against any such preponderance of foreign influence is to put the ballot in the hands of the American born woman. . . ." (p. 39). Blake offered Woman Suffrage as a means of protection against a "foreign invasion" of non-White voters. Educated White women would serve to uphold the racist status quo. Her argument played on the nativist beliefs and fears of many American men. Many Southern suffragists saw themselves as protectors of White supremacy and defenders of White America.

On the opposite side of the argument, Elizabeth Cady Stanton gave a stirring speech before Congress in 1892 entitled "The Solitude of Self," later printed in the *Woman's Journal*. Foundational to her argument was the common humanity shared by men and women, and part of that humanity was the "bitter solitude of self" (Stanton 1915, p. 4). Since there are moments in each human's life that can only be experienced alone, and each individual

will face such a moment, everybody must be able to exercise the greatest possible freedom for personal development: "It is the height of cruelty to rob the individual of a single natural right" (Stanton 1915, p. 4). Here Stanton uses the language of natural law, the Enlightenment, and the American Revolution to make her case for Woman Suffrage. When the government systematically denied women the vote, it robbed women of a part of her political rights, which were naturally universal: "If we consider her as a citizen . . . she must have the same rights as all other members, according to the fundamental principles of our Government" (Stanton 1915, p. 1). Stanton then asked the devastating question, "[w]ho, I ask you, can take, dare take on himself the rights, the duties, the responsibilities of another human soul?" (p. 9).

Stanton argued that when a government denies part of the population of the governed suffrage, that population cannot live to be its best selves. In denying women equal political rights, the government sent ill-equipped women off to battle "the solitude of self." In order to be full citizens, women must have the franchise, "[t]o deny political quality is to rob the ostracised [sic] of . . . self respect . . . a voice among those who make and administer the law; a choice in the jury . . . and in the judge who decides their punishment" (Stanton 1915, p. 4). Allowing women the vote would immediately give them a stake in society and increase their ability to withstand the solitude of self: "Nothing strengthens the judgment and quickens the conscience like individual responsibility; nothing adds such dignity to character as the recognition of one's self-sovereignty; the right to an equal place" (Stanton 1915, p. 6). Stanton believed voting was a critical part of citizenship. Calling for Woman Suffrage based on a justice argument meant that full citizenship was not contingent upon the behavior or some perceived innate goodness of women. Embracing the natural right's argument disallowed these contingencies as a basis for equal participation.

Hawkesworth's gender as an analytic category calls to the scholar while reading Stanton's argument. Stanton's argument only applies to her and to other women of her social standing. While Stanton may have believed she spoke for a universal sisterhood of women in shared bondage, she does not address the multiple systems of oppression faced by women of color, nor does she address

class.

This deficiency was highlighted in an 1894 issue of the *Woman's Journal*. Editorials from Henry Blackwell, Anna Gardner, and William Lloyd Garrison discussed the question of an educational requirement for Woman Suffrage. All three used the justice/natural rights argument to make their case. However, even within the early Woman Suffrage movement, differences on who should be included in enfranchising women played out.

Blackwell (1894) argued for an educational requirement because he believed it was “absolutely necessary for forming an intelligent opinion . . .” (p. 332). The idea that any ballot measure affected not only the individual voter, but her community as well, called for such a requirement. He argued that one of the largest “practical obstacles” (p. 332) to enfranchising women was “a general unwillingness to double the vote by adding indiscriminately to the body politic all women, however ignorant and inexperienced” (p. 332). Blackwell was willing to initially limit the expansion of Woman Suffrage, through an educational requirement, to a marginalized population of educated White women, who he believed would eventually aide other marginalized populations, such as noneducated White women or women of color, to attain the vote.

Gardner (1894) rejected the idea of an educational requirement, saying, “This position . . . is a virtual surrender of the basic principle of the woman suffrage movement . . .” (p. 332). Gardner reiterated the claim in Declaration of Independence of “consent of the governed” as the highest and most stable foundation for the argument in favor of enfranchising women. She argued those women who would be barred from the vote because of the educational requirement were the women most in need of the vote. Gardner rejected the argument that educated women would utilize their vote to aid those still unenfranchised and vulnerable women left out by the educational requirement. “Women are human, not angelic” (p. 332). Gardner also too hoped for “intelligent suffrage,” (p. 332) but she believed an educational requirement would necessarily harm the Woman Suffrage movement as a whole. She closed with a quote from Stanton, ““that universal suffrage is the first and only basis of a genuine Republic”” (p. 332).

Garrison (1894) repudiated Blackwell's concern

about uneducated voters enacting legislation Blackwell deemed bad: “The right to vote for wrong and injurious measures is as sacred as the right to vote for correct and helpful ones” (p. 332). Garrison cautioned against women accepting such a measure because men did not have such a qualifier: “. . . to ask women to accept a condition from which men are exempt is to concede that sex differentiates rights” (p. 332). He too, like Gardner, claimed the language of the Declaration of Independence, “[w]e shall fight better uncompromisingly, and should stick to the principles that the government can only derive its just powers for the consent of the governed” (p. 332).

While these three editorials all utilized the natural rights/justice argument, they differed in their practice, with Blackwell calling for an educational requirement. This call created instability in the justice argument that Gardner and Garrison rejected. It is noteworthy that both Blackwell and Garrison supported the 14th Amendment with the belief that expanding suffrage to Black men would in turn help the cause of Woman Suffrage.

Mary Church Terrell's editorial printed in the *Woman's Journal* in 1900 held fast to the justice argument. She argued the government, founded on the principles of “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” for its' citizens is “hold[ing] one half of its citizens in legal subjection to the other, without being able to assign good and sufficient reasons for such a flagrant violation of the very principles upon which it was founded” (Terrell 1900, p. 54). Terrell saw no reason why women should be denied enfranchisement even if the majority of women did not want the vote. The justice argument did not rest on whether or not a majority of women wanted suffrage; its foundation lay in the “inalienability of human rights” (p. 54). She pointedly argued that even an “idiot [sic]” (p. 54) saw the glaring disparity between what is professed by America's founding documents and how the government treated female citizens. Terrell explained how well Woman Suffrage worked in places that enfranchised women such as, Australia, New Zealand, and states out West, “. . . wherever woman suffrage has been tried it has been a glorious success”(p. 54).

As a Black woman, Terrell embraced the natural rights argument, which was also the foundation of the abolition movement. While she did weave

expediency into her main argument, by asking, “[h]ow long, think you, would the sweat shops be tolerated . . . how long would child labor be possible in factories . . . how long would unsanitary conditions prevail . . . if women could throttle these and other travesties . . . by their votes at the polls?” (Terrell 1900, p. 54). However, Terrell did not see behavior or attitude as conditions for full participation in government. She believed women should be enfranchised because of their citizenship. Black Americans’ argument for citizenship, born out of hundreds of years of slavery and the Civil War, was an inherently stable argument.

Laura Clay’s article, “Counterparts,” published in the *Woman’s Journal* in 1901 also utilized the natural rights argument. The nature of men and women as “counterparts” or two halves of the same whole was foundational to her argument. This oneness meant the fight over Woman Suffrage would not be a battle between two separate peoples. “Men and women are the two halves of one dual humanity, indivisible and inseparable, so that one cannot gain or lose without the other” (Clay, 1901, p. 191.) This unity between men and women meant that by definition the denial to half of the citizen population full citizen participation was an unnatural act. “. . . [I]t has become necessary for a more perfect liberty of the people that suffrage shall be extended to women . . . our object is one whose attainment . . . is full of benefit to men as to women” (Clay, 1901, p. 190). Clay called on men to re-embrace the rights and responsibilities of the Declaration of Independence for the good of male and female citizens.

As the Woman Suffrage movement slowly and unsuccessfully dragged on in the South, Clay embraced expediency arguments and supported Mississippi’s 1907 unsuccessful state suffrage amendment that would have enfranchise only White women (Wheeler, 1993, pp. 121–125). Clay’s racism allowed her to see the justice argument as pertaining to only White women. As Southern states lobbied for individual state suffrage amendments, Southern suffragists in general began to adopt expediency arguments. Those few, like Clay, who previously argued from a natural rights perspective, also embraced expediency arguments, which were often rife with racism (Wheeler, 1993, pp. 121–125).

Southern suffragists, such as Mary Wood Swift and Belle Kearney, claimed that by

enfranchising women the South could solidify White supremacy. Often these women utilized demographic information to demonstrate the ratio of White people to Black people. In an address to the National Suffrage Convention in 1903, Swift (1903) confirmed: “We point to the official statistics for proof that there are more white women in the United States than colored [sic] men and women together . . .” (p. 42). By granting suffrage to White women, the demography of voters would shift in favor of White supremacists, therefore enabling them to block any state legislation brought by Black voters. Voting White women would also ensure “appropriate” United States senators and congressmen represented Southern states in Washington.

Kearney, who also addressed the 1903 National Suffrage convention, argued, “[t]he enfranchisement of women would insure immediate and durable White supremacy, honestly attained . . . in every southern State . . .” (Kearney 1903, p. 44). In this argument, Kearney tried to demonstrate the value of the White woman’s vote. This expediency argument was a call to action on the part of White Southern men. If they truly valued their White traditions, then they must extend suffrage to women, no matter how untenable it may seem, in order to protect those values.

In 1908 Elizabeth M. Gilmer, under the pseudonym Dorothy Dix, penned the article, “Women Ought to Vote, Because . . .” The first part of the article focused on why women ought to vote, which was based on a natural rights argument and made use of the language of the American Revolution. Gilmer (1908) begins “‘Taxation without representation is tyranny,’ whether the individual . . . wears trousers or petticoats” (p. 97), and “[a]ll just governments must rest upon the consent of the governed” (p. 97). Dix quickly shifted her argument to “women should vote,” this emphasis on should allowed her to further her argument based on expediency. “Women are unlike men,” (Gilmer 1908, p. 97) and as such, value different things than men, such as regulating the meat industries and keeping neighborhoods clean and disease free. Dix pointed to states that barred women from voting, where she claimed men were responsible for the “rottenness of politics and for . . . plundered and misruled cities” (Gilmer 1908, p. 98). She argued that women are more moral

than men, and that they would elect leaders who focused on protecting children. Dix also believed that because girls received more education than boys, and because women actively participated in “study clubs” (Gilmer 1908, p. 98) and personal reading, females now had a better mind for voting. She viewed marked difference between men and women, but for Dix, that difference meant bringing a feminine counterbalance to the maleness of civic matters.

While the majority of the article was argued on behalf of expediency, Dix believed women deserved suffrage on account of their common natural rights with men. She could hold both justice and expediency in her mind, and she envisioned all the “good” that could blossom from female participation in politics. This is another example of how the line between justice and expediency arguments was not always as severe or disconnected as Kraditor argued. Yet, the foundation of Dix’s rhetoric was more stable because she began her argument from justice.

Jane Addams’ piece, “Why Women Should Vote,” published in the *Ladies Home Journal* in 1910 and then reprinted by National American Woman Suffrage Association (NAWSA) in 1912, stands apart from both the justice and expediency arguments. According to Kraditor (1965), Addams’ main focus was not suffrage but Progressivism, and her political ideology came from her work at Hull-House. This political background allowed her to focus on the powerlessness of working mothers and families. In the article, she recounted stories of mothers whose children died, through no fault of the mother, but due to the squalid tenement conditions.

While some of the language is similar to that used in expediency arguments, Addams’ goal was not the marginalization or disenfranchisement of immigrant or Black women. Instead, she argued that women should vote because they lacked power to protect their families from the disease and danger of big city life. Addams (1912) utilized nonthreatening language to engage men and women who viewed public activity or the enfranchisement of women negatively:

If women follow only the lines of their traditional activities here are certain primary duties which belong to even the most conservative women, and which no one women or group of

women can adequately discharge unless they join the more general movements looking toward social amelioration through legal enactment (p. 8).

Some of her argument contained positive essentialism; women should vote because they are mothers and will therefore use their vote as a positive extension of that role. “They [mothers] simply want an opportunity to do their own work and to take care of those affairs which naturally and historically belong to women . . .” (Addams 1912, p. 18). Yet her message to working-class and immigrant women was one of empowerment. Surely enough women experienced these many oppressions. In this context, Woman Suffrage became an opportunity for women to take care of their children, their schools, and their local communities. Even, Kraditor recognized Addams as having an egalitarian backbone.

By the 1911 National American Suffrage Convention, Southern suffragists’ strategy had not changed. Madeline Breckinridge (1911) argued, “[t]here were over 600,000 more White women in the southern states than there were [N]egros, [sic] men and women combined” (p. 148). By enfranchising all women these suffragists could logically explain how the White female population would serve to counteract “negative” or “harmful” legislation Black men and women supported. Breckenridge (1911) added, “[i]f the literate women of the South were enfranchised it would insure an immense preponderance of the Anglo-Saxon over the African . . .” (p. 148).

While Kraditor marks the shift in arguments from justice to expediency as starting in 1900, in 1914, President of NAWSA Anna Howard Shaw gave a hearty defense of the justice argument in an article titled, “Equal Suffrage—A Problem of Political Justice.” Shaw gave a detailed account of neighboring states that passed their own state suffrage legislation and of countries such as Finland, Norway, Australia, and New Zealand that had enfranchised their women. Shaw (1914) stated that because each victory met with a “mass of favorable evidence,” (p. 94) it “would seem to make it unnecessary to discuss votes for women from the standpoint of expediency, even if one believed that a fundamental principle should be affected by the questions of expediency” (p. 94). In this way, Shaw is not negating the valid argument that women should vote to insure the

safety and security of her family, but she addressed what she saw as a flaw that could be exploited by antisuffragists.

Shaw argued women's citizenship was the most solid and powerful answer to the question of why women should vote. Given the foundation of the country, its claims to democracy, and "consent of the governed," full citizenship required political representation. Shaw (1914) cautioned fellow suffragist to not get bogged down in expediency arguments:

It seems to me very unfortunate that we suffragists should ever permit ourselves to thus over-qualify for the vote, which is exactly what we do when we prove or attempt to prove our fitness for the ballot, and our need of it, on any other ground than that of mere citizenship (p. 96).

Instead, she encouraged fellow suffragists not to give in to the destructive force of over-qualifying for the vote but to argue "[t]he reason women should be enfranchised is because, as citizens, they have a stake in the government" (Shaw 1914, p. 96). She argued that when women called for enfranchisement based on how they would vote they unwittingly gave credence to the other side that there should be qualifications on Woman Suffrage, ". . . we should not answer our opponents when they argue along these lines, because facts as to the result of equal suffrage . . . have no bearing on our question" (p. 95). Shaw claimed that suffragists who argued by expediency also put an undue burden on other women: "We and the women who come after us should have our political power to use in anyway way we think best . . . We cannot tell . . . what women will do" (p. 97). Guaranteeing women the vote based on the qualification that they would only vote a certain way potentially left generations of women with yet another political disadvantage.

As with Stanton's *The Solitude of Self*, Shaw did not place restrictions, qualifications, or conditions on full citizenship, which could only be attained by Woman Suffrage. Shaw, as president of NAWSA, presided over the shift in suffrage arguments from broad justice arguments to micro, state level expediency arguments, yet she held on tightly to her belief that a natural rights/justice argument would in the end be the single strongest case women could present.

The suffrage argument from justice had an inherently stable foundation of what it meant to

be a citizen: It was a right. Full citizenship, which could only be achieved by political participation, belonged to every citizen of the United States. For suffragists, to be deemed a citizen yet denied the ballot made the word citizen hollow and meaningless. Suffrage should be granted to American women because the government claimed them as citizens.

The expediency argument, while not always made out of racism or nativism, claimed suffrage for women because of the perceived nature of women. If citizenship hinged on behavior or political affiliation, then the idea of citizenship could never be stable. If the requirements for participatory citizenship, i.e., suffrage, could change, then that right could be forever moved out of reach or taken away once granted.

In the research performed for this article, Newman's criticism of Kraditor's timeline held true. The use of the two suffrage arguments was much more fluid than Kraditor thought. Yet, the categories named by Kraditor are an excellent tool for analysis. By incorporating Shklar's theory of examining citizenship through the eyes of people traditionally denied it, and Hawkesworth's gender as an analytic category, this article is able to demonstrate a feminist interpretation of these historical documents. Interdisciplinarity helps reveal a more dynamic view of the history of the American Woman Suffrage movement.

SELECTED HISTORIOGRAPHY

The selected historiography of the American Woman Suffrage movement, which features women's historians and a feminist political scientist, reflects the impact of Kraditor's 1965 *The Ideas of the Woman Suffrage Movement, 1890–1920*. Scholars often take up her categories of justice and expediency, and some try to expand the categories while others work to refute the dichotomy all together. The authors employ traditional historical evidence, such as letters, diaries, speeches, minutes from meetings of suffrage organizations, and they rely heavily upon archival work within suffrage publications. The analysis demonstrates the interdisciplinary nature of these scholarly works and how the authors' individual arguments work together or against one another.

In this historiography, Hawkesworth's gender as an analytic category is utilized to demonstrate how regional differences and socioeconomic

status influenced concepts of appropriate behavior for women. The socioeconomic status and the relatively small number of women detailed in the historiography must be examined. Only elite White women, who had time and money and therefore did not struggle to feed themselves or their families, participated at the highest level within suffrage organizations. This means the women producing the arguments were not a representative sample of suffragists overall. Shklar's theory of citizenship is used to examine the difference between how Northern and Southern suffragists perceived Woman Suffrage and therefore citizenship and to analyze the differences in arguments over time. Using Hawkesworth and Shklar allows for a feminist reading and exploration of the historiography.

Suzanne Marilley, a political scientist, repudiated much of Kraditor's argument in her 1996 monograph *Woman Suffrage and the Origins of Liberal Feminism in the United States*. Utilizing Shklar's *American Citizenship*, Marilley (1996) argues that Kraditor offers up a false dichotomy of arguments from justice versus expediency. Marilley's argument is persuasive because some suffragists did fall in between arguments, such as Jane Addams. As discussed earlier, Addams argued for the enfranchisement of women as a means for women to gain control over their lives, become full citizens, and increase their abilities to aid their local communities. However, Addams did not use the expediency argument as a means to withhold votes from women of color or to "counteract" the votes of newly freed men.

Instead, Marilley (1996) offers types of "three dissenting political ideologies of American woman's rights reformers and woman suffragists . . . Feminism of Equal Rights, Feminism of Fear, and Feminism of Personal Development" (p. 6). Although Marilley claims to repudiate Kraditor, her first category, Feminism of Equal Rights, has the same foundation as Kraditor's first delineation of suffrage arguments. Marilley restates Kraditor's thesis by arguing that the earliest suffragists—Stanton, Anthony, Mott, and Stone—all argued for the enfranchisement of women based on women and men sharing a common humanity. However, Marilley offers the Feminism of Fear as a way to explain the shift in suffrage argumentation. Feminism of Fear argued for suffrage as a way for women to protect themselves. Marilley points to

Francis Willard as a main proponent of Feminism of Fear. Since the private sphere was deemed the only appropriate sphere for women, Willard argued that women must step outside that sphere and enter the public sphere as a way for women to protect their proper domestic sphere. The category of Feminism of Fear is quite similar to Kraditor's category of suffrage argumentation for the sake of expediency. Both categories described the helplessness of most women in political terms. Feminism of Fear encourages women to protect themselves from the horrors of alcohol, unfair housing practices, and lack of sanitation. Kraditor's expediency argument allowed for suffragists to engage in whatever argumentation would allow for greater acceptance of Woman Suffrage.

As an example of this policy, in 1903 NAWSA held a "convention on the principals of 'states rights' as a basis of the relationships of state Suffrage organizations to one another and to the National" (Kraditor, 1965, p. 165). Local NAWSA chapters had autonomy to set eligibility requirements for joining and to advocate for Woman Suffrage with any argument the local chapter deemed most effective. This emphasis on "states rights" was a direct result of the regional differences between suffragists. Kraditor argues that suffrage advocates who argued from justice set aside their concerns over the racist traditions of the Southern suffragists.

Historian Marjorie Spruill Wheeler, in her 1993 book *New Women of the New South: The Leaders of the Woman Suffrage Movement in the Southern States*, argues that Southern Suffragists lived within the most confining society for White women. They also had difficulty accepting that Black men who were once their slaves now had (in theory) more political power than they did. Educated White women now felt they were at the political mercy of uneducated Black men. Southern suffragists saw Black suffrage as an "anathema" (Wheeler, 1993, p. xiii). These women advocated suffrage as a way to counteract any Black voters. Since the number of eligible Black voters was small in comparison to the number of women who would benefit from enfranchisement, Woman Suffrage became a way to maintain the "traditions" of the old South.

The passage of the Fifteenth Amendment was more than Southern suffragists could stomach. Their rhetoric and propaganda became more

vitriolic, and Southern suffrage advocates spoke unequivocally about the usefulness of lynching Black men who threatened White women (Wheeler, 1993). Wheeler's regional look at Southern suffragists follows Kraditor's argument of expediency. White Southern suffragists with the tacit approval of Northern suffragists utilized racist arguments to encourage Southern men and women to rally behind Woman Suffrage. Wheeler's work also allows scholars to discuss what Woman Suffrage meant to Southern suffragists.

Utilizing Shklar's theory of defining citizenship through those who have been historically denied it, the scholar cannot help but theorize what full citizenship wrought by suffrage meant for these women. Since Southern suffragists embraced expediency arguments, it is logical to point out that these women saw the vote as a conditional right that should only be granted to either White women only or all women for the sole purpose of protecting "white values" and White supremacy. This reinforces Kraditor's idea that suffrage advocates were split between arguments from justice verses arguments from expediency.

Susan Marshall's (1997) *Splintered Sisterhood: Gender and Class in the Campaign against Woman Suffrage* uses social history to explain phenomena within the Woman Suffrage movement. Marshall delves into the women of the anti-Women's Suffrage movement. Through analysis of primary source documents, most coming from the Massachusetts Association Opposed to Further Extension of Suffrage to Women (Marshall, 1997), she encourages readers not to view antisuffrage women as helpless actors working on behalf of the men in their lives but to focus on their agency as political and social actors (Marshall, 1997). Marshall wishes to view these actors from a sociological framework, and she encourages the reader to see the actions of antisuffrage women as a social movement rather than solely a political one. Marshall breathes life into the women of the antisuffrage movement, who were often considered to be flat, one-dimensional, and "static" historical figures working at the behest of their husbands (Marshall, 1997, p. 4). The author demonstrates these women agitated and campaigned on their own, working to salvage what little social and political power they gained by the nature of their elite status.

Marshall (1997) utilizes resource mobilization

theory, which "underscores the social networks and organizational ties that facilitate social movement recruitment among women denied access to the formal political process" (p. 13). One of Marshall's main arguments is that antisuffrage women mobilized in a similar fashion to woman suffragists. Antisuffrage women utilized "leadership, internal organization, financial support, recruitment strategies, maintenance of members' participation . . . goal transformation, and both competition and cooperation with other social movements organizations . . ." (Marshall, 1997, p. 13). While female antisuffrage advocates cloaked themselves in "traditional femininity" and the "proper sphere" for womanhood, they also published tracts, spoke in public, and engaged in other "unsexing" behaviors, the same behaviors used by women working on behalf of gaining the franchise.

Marshall also utilizes resource mobilization theory to "emphasize its strategic components, proposing that propaganda serves many social movement functions, including recruitment, self-affirmation, group solidarity, and separation from adversaries" (Marshall, 1997, p. 13). These antisuffrage women did not lack gender consciousness. They understood that their gender precluded them from the kind of social and political power held by men, but these elite women wanted to retain their status within the status quo.

Christina Lunardini (1986) focused on the more militant Alice Paul and the final push for suffrage. In these final years, suffragists returned to an argument from justice as explained by Kraditor or a Feminism of Personal Development as explained by Marilley. Alice Paul was not concerned about how women would vote once Woman Suffrage was attained:

I think if we get freedom for women, then they are probably going to do a lot of things that I wish they wouldn't do; but it seems to me that isn't our business to say what they should do with it. It is our business to see that they get it (Lunardini 1986, p. xix).

However, Paul and her fellow militants would not have been successful without the groundwork put in by suffragists arguing from expediency, which caused several states to ratify state constitutional amendments granting women the right to vote in presidential elections.

Here Hawkesworth's gender as an analytic

category helps to examine the bravery of Alice Paul and the Congressional Union, who marched in parades and later picketed in front of the White House during WWI. While many elite women thought picketing the White House was “sensational and undignified” (Lunardini, 1986, p. 106), Josephine DuPont and Queene Coonely supported the effort monetarily. Adherence to gendered behavior prevented some women from participating in the most overt suffrage strategies, yet women of wealth did have the opportunity to offer financial backing for the women who wished to agitate in public. Others chided Paul and the Union for their “conduct” (Lunardini, 1986, p. 108).

Katherine Adams and Michael Keene’s (2008) *Alice Paul and the American Suffrage Campaign* also focuses on how Paul’s behavior was deemed inappropriate by leaders in the Woman Suffrage movement as well as antisuffrage women. Adams and Keene depart from the more traditional scholarship of evaluating the Woman Suffrage movement as a whole, and focus mainly on Paul. This marks a shift in what has become a “traditional” telling of the American Woman Suffrage movement that focused on Stanton, Anthony, Mott, and Stone. Adams and Keene detail Paul’s childhood and roots within her Quaker community, her time in England working with the Pankhurst family, and her push to utilize “visual rhetoric” to allow the Woman Suffrage movement to make visual arguments (Adams & Keene, 2008, p. xvi). Again, Adams and Keene fall into the tradition of Kraditor and Marilley who acknowledge that Paul brought about a return to the justice argument or the Feminism of Personal Development for the enfranchisement of women.

Unlike Kraditor, Marilley, Wheeler, Lunardini, and Adams and Keene, who explain the Woman Suffrage as a political movement, Ellen Carol DuBois’ (1978) *Feminism and Suffrage: The Emergence of an Independent Women’s Movement in America, 1884–1869*, focuses on the social history of early suffragists rather than seeing Woman Suffrage as “an isolated intuitional reform” (p. 17). DuBois documents how the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments split the Woman Suffrage movement. She begins by noting that all early suffragists, including Stanton, Anthony, Stone, and Lucretia Mott, made their first foray into public politics through abolition. A large fracturing of the

movement began with the drafting of the Fourteenth Amendment. Stanton and Anthony believed that by including the word “male” in the amendment it codified male supremacy, which would increase the difficulty of passing a federal Woman Suffrage amendment.

The text of the Fifteenth Amendment, guaranteeing voting rights for Black male citizens, increased the tension within Woman Suffrage circles. Charles Sumner, the author of both amendments, and fellow supporters of Woman Suffrage Wendell Phillips and Fredrick Douglass, believed attaching Woman Suffrage to the amendment would kill it during the ratification process. They were willing to try for Black male Suffrage first, believing that any extension of suffrage would help the overall cause of extending suffrage to other marginalized groups, including women. Lucy Stone and her husband Henry Blackwell fought to keep the two issues tied together, with the hope that both would pass. Stanton and Anthony openly campaigned against the Fifteenth Amendment, not because they opposed Black male suffrage, but because they would not allow their political struggle to be secondary to voting rights for Black men.

DuBois (1978) also argues that this split from abolition by Stanton and Anthony finally allowed Woman Suffrage to become its own social movement, which allowed women to focus their attention solely on promoting the suffrage agenda. This split resulted in the proliferation of suffrage publications with Stanton and Anthony working for *Revolution* and later completing the *HWS* separate from and Stone and Blackwell, who created the *Woman’s Journal*.

CONCLUSION

Using the frameworks provided by Kraditor, Shklar, and Hawkesworth on the historiography of the Woman Suffrage movement produces similar results to what is found when analyzing the primary source documents in this way. Interdisciplinarity allows for a deeper and more dynamic exploration of secondary sources. Kraditor’s categories of justice and expediency arguments offer a starting point of analysis. Shklar’s theory on citizenship calls the scholar to dissect the rhetoric used in justice and expediency argument as a means to extrapolate the nature of citizenship. By using Hawkesworth, insights into the trappings of gender are plainly seen in primary source documents. The

justice argument did not hold firmly onto gender roles and language; instead, it allowed suffragists to claim rhetoric that had traditionally been denied to them. The expediency argument utilized gendered language and ideas, and this argument often embraced positive essentialism.

This approach also allows for a more thorough understanding of secondary sources. By using Hawkesworth's gender as an analytic category and Shklar's theory of citizenship, the primary source documents and the historiography of the American Woman Suffrage movement can be analyzed as a feminist history. Through analyzing women, navigating through the restrictions and confines placed on them by how gender functioned at the time, a feminist history comes forth and offers a more holistic and multidimensional discussion of these women. Any discussion of women in history without analyzing how gender functioned within a specific time and place will produce a more homogeneous and surface understanding of women.

In order to fully incorporate women into the contemporary political sphere, women need to be fully integrated into history—not as a monolith, but as individuals. As demonstrated by the use of the frameworks of Kraditor, Shklar, and Hawkesworth in analyzing the primary source documents and historiography, the American Woman Suffrage movement was not monolithic. It was a movement made up of flawed individuals who utilized what small political power they had to work for the enfranchisement of all women.

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BIOGRAPHY

Molly Daichendt holds Bachelor's degrees in history and psychology and a Master of Arts in interdisciplinary studies with an emphasis in American History from Arizona State University. She works as an instructional assistant in the English department of Grand Canyon University. Her areas of research include American women's history with an emphasis in the intellectual history of the American Woman Suffrage movement.